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ABSTRACT 
 
‘Solidarity’ conjures up positive images of the strength of togetherness and 
community, but in practice it is experienced by groups when confronted by 
real or perceived threat from other groups. The ideal of a universal human 
solidarity appears tenuous and flimsy. However, Richard Rorty and Axel 
Honneth have, in different ways, attempted to bring this ideal under 
philosophical consideration. This paper argues that their treatment of human 
solidarity is flawed by their a priori rejection of the normative idea of a 
common human nature. Such an idea, which I term ‘radical humanism’, is 
reconstructed from the work Erich Fromm, and one of its chief implications, 
the rejection of liberal nationalism, is proposed as part of a radical challenge 
to contemporary social and political theory. 
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The word ‘solidarity’ carries positive connotations of sympathy, cooperation 
and altruism, yet it is most frequently invoked and experienced in situations 
of bitter conflict. In protracted strikes or wars we witness heroic acts of 
sacrifice and commitment to the common cause, but the antagonistic 
framework in which actually existing solidarity operates seems only to remind 
us how far we are from making a reality of the ancient dream of human 
solidarity, a condition of universal respect for humans qua humans, 
irrespective of our differences. However, there have been attempts to rescue 
the broader ideal of human solidarity from neglect, and two important 
contributions will be considered here; Richard Rorty’s liberal pragmatist 
argument in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, originally published in 1989, 
and Axel Honneth’s inter-subjectivist account in The Struggle for Recognition, 
which first appeared in German in 1992.  Both conceptions share an 
opposition to essentialism, that is to say they reject the idea that there is a 
common human essence which could serve as an ethical foundation for 
solidarity. In general such an ideal is treated with deep scepticism in modern 
social science, and this is reflected in Margaret Canovan’s recent dismissal of 
the invocation of common humanity as the ‘grandest but flimsiest of 
contemporary imagined communities’ (Canovan, 2001, p. 212). Nevertheless, 
I will argue that both anti-foundationalist and inter-subjectivist conceptions of 
solidarity are flawed and that the concept of human solidarity becomes more 
robust when grounded in a normative conception of human nature which I 
will term ‘radical humanism’. The term is borrowed from Erich Fromm, who 
uses it to denote the body of thought which developed as a protest against 
the dehumanising tendencies of capitalist society and which held out the 
promise of a new form of cooperative, international emancipation (Fromm, 
2002, pp. 154- 167).  
I will deal first with the attempts of Rorty and Honneth to theorise 
human solidarity without having recourse to a philosophical conception of 
human essence. In Rorty’s case, I will argue, his appeal for solidarity implicitly 
relies on a suppressed essentialism, but his anti-foundationalist convictions 
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prevent him from giving proper consideration to the idea of human essence. 
In Honneth’s case, the rejection of a normative view of what it is to be human 
leaves him without the means to evaluate which claims for recognition might 
move us closer to the overall goal of societal solidarity. The second section  
outlines  the main features of radical humanism, drawing largely on Fromm’s 
work, and argues that it provides a sound ethical basis for criticising existing 
social relations and for making positive appeals for solidarity on a global 
basis. It could also form a basis for the theoretical formulation of evaluative 
criteria with which to identify the ideas, practices and movements which carry 
the goal forward politically. The third section returns to the problem of the 
tension between the normative goal of human solidarity and particular 
expressions of solidarity at group or national level. The radical humanist 
perspective requires the strongest possible rejection of liberal nationalist 
claims that the nation or nation-state is the proper locus of political 
community. Finally I suggest that radical humanism offers a sound 
philosophical grounding for appeals to human solidarity without imposing an 
over-stipulative vision which might be insensitive to cultural diversity. 
 
 
Rorty and Honneth 
 
Richard Rorty’s commitment to human solidarity, allied to a traditional liberal 
attachment to tolerance and individual liberty, has exerted a strong attraction 
for those who share his scepticism towards  the professed certainties of 
traditional metaphysics and epistemology. Not only is he openly in favour of 
progressing towards greater solidarity among the peoples of the world, but he 
argues that there is such a thing as moral progress and that it is ‘in the 
direction of greater human solidarity’ (Rorty, 1996, p. 192). However, he is at 
pains to point out that his conception does not involve an acceptance of some 
recognition of a core self, the human essence, in all human beings. Rather it 
is based  on the development of an awareness that traditional difference 
between people are unimportant ‘when concerned with similarities with 
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respect to pain and humiliation’ (Rorty, 1996, p. 192). For Rorty, moral 
obligation to one’s fellow human beings derives from the fact that they are 
considered to be ‘one of us’,  the ‘us’  referring always to membership of a 
specific group. An appeal to ‘one of us human beings’ will never possess the 
same force as an appeal to the ‘us’ which refers to a smaller and more local 
group. As an example he selects the plight of young urban black men in the 
United States, stating that an appeal to help them will be both morally and 
politically more persuasive if they are described as fellow Americans rather 
than as fellow human-beings (Rorty, 1996, pp. 190 – 91). According to Rorty 
it is an illusion to conceive of solidarity as something pre-existing which can 
be realised once we shed our prejudices, but rather it is something that has 
to be created by imagination, the ‘imaginative ability to see strange people as 
fellow sufferers’ (Rorty, 1996, p. xvi). This can be achieved in democratic 
societies by learning more about others (description), through which we 
become more sensitive to the pain suffered by unfamiliar people, and by 
learning more about ourselves (redescription), through which we are obliged 
to reinvestigate ourselves. Although this can be accomplished through a 
variety of media, the novel is accorded particular significance (Rorty, 1996, p. 
xvi). So, through this combination of Nietzsche’s rejection of all philosophical 
certainties and Dewey’s commitment to democracy and self-improvement, 
Rorty advocates the realisation of a utopia such as human solidarity as an 
‘endless, proliferating realisation of Freedom, rather than a convergence 
towards an already existing truth’ (Rorty, 1996, p. xvi). 
 Rorty sees the idea of an intrinsic nature as a remnant of the idea that 
the world is a divine creation, and he commends instead an attitude whereby 
nothing is worshipped or treated as a quasi-divinity, and everything is seen to 
be a product of time and chance (Rorty, 1996, pp. 21-2). This rejection of 
philosophical humanism, however, raises the question of whether there can 
be any reasons why individuals should regard greater human solidarity as a 
desirable goal. Rather than providing a reason, Rorty offers a ‘feeling’ 
common to us all, the fear of humiliation; recognition of our common 
susceptibility to humiliation is the only social bond that is needed to widen 
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human solidarity. He contrasts this favourably with the ‘metaphysician’s’ 
reliance on a ‘larger shared power’ such as God, truth or rationality which has 
to be invoked in order to demonstrate that we all share something in common 
(Rorty, 1996, p. 91). For an avowed anti-foundationalist it is odd that Rorty 
concedes the need to invoke a common feeling to ground his commitment to 
solidarity. As Diane Rothleder points out, it is theoretically necessary in 
Rorty’s account for the appeal to solidarity to be couched in negative terms in 
order to avoid the notion of a ‘positive shared project’ (Rothleder, 1999, p. 
45). He avoids the risk of providing something that might inspire a quasi-
religious sense of devotion, but we are obliged to question his selection of the 
susceptibility to humiliation as the crucial aspect of our humanity and to query 
why this doesn’t amount to simply another form of essentialism. The choice of 
humiliation seems quite arbitrary. It is not even clear that the capacity to 
suffer humiliation is species-specific – anyone who has witnessed gorillas in a 
zoo being taunted by unthinking children will immediately recognise their 
response as one of indignation. However, setting aside the questionable 
choice of ‘humiliation’ as the central experience, it is surely the case that 
Rorty is offering an alternative essentialism. This has been convincingly 
argued by Norman Geras, who points out that Rorty is ultimately falling back 
on the fact that human  beings have a nature, one which may be repressed 
or violated (Geras, 1995, pp. 89-90). He suggests that it is implausible to 
insist on the communal sources of strong solidarity, and at the same time 
insist on the irrelevance of the idea of a common humanity ‘to the goal of 
more expansive solidaristic relations’ (Geras, 1995, p. 90). Geras points out 
that in Rorty’s Amnesty International lecture he supplies a number of 
examples of atrocities being justified by the perpetrators on the grounds that 
their victims were not properly human, and Rorty’s acknowledgement of this 
need to de-humanise the victim undermines his claim that the appeal to 
common humanity is weak and unconvincing (Geras, 1995, p. 97). Rorty fails 
to see that his own position relies on what we share in common as human 
beings, and he fails to consider what an openly essentialist argument for 
solidarity might look like. 
  
P
t-P
in
 6
 Honneth offers a more sophisticated attempt to elucidate the 
theoretical preconditions for the achievement of human solidarity in The 
Struggle for Recognition. Honneth sets out to meet a challenge posed by the 
young Hegel, to present a philosophical reconstruction of an ethical 
community as the culmination of a sequence of stages involving the struggle 
for recognition of various groups (Honneth, 1996, p. 67).  He argues that 
Hegel abandoned this project sometime after writing The System of Ethical 
Life in 1802, moving on to a philosophy of self-consciousness. Honneth  notes 
that the early work operates within an Aristotelian frame of reference 
(Honneth, 1996, p. 25), but instead of Aristotle’s reliance on the nature of 
humanity as the foundation for the good life, Hegel looks to ground his ethical 
community in the real relationships between individuals and groups (Honneth, 
1996, p. 17). Honneth deploys the work of the social psychologist George 
Herbert Mead to provide a materialistic and naturalistic demonstration of the 
crucial role of inter-subjective recognition in the formation of identity 
(Honneth, 1996, chapter 4). Honneth argues that for both Mead and the early 
Hegel the reproduction of social life is governed by the imperative of mutual 
recognition, because ‘one can develop a practical relation-to-self only when 
one has learned to view oneself from the normative perspective of one’s 
partners in interaction’ (Honneth, 1996, pp. 92-3). This imperative produces 
the normative pressure to remove constraints on the meaning of mutual 
recognition, so that, as individualisation develops historically, so too should 
the relations of mutual recognition. Honneth considers that what is lacking in 
Hegel and Mead is an explanation of the social experiences that would 
generate the pressure through which the demands for recognition are 
transformed into social movements, and to do this he suggests that we need 
to study the specific forms of disrespect through which actors realise their 
oppression (Honneth, 1996, p. 93). 
 Honneth identifies three levels or patterns of recognition. First there is 
the love and friendship developed in intimate relations, which gives us self-
confidence. Then there is the recognition which we achieve through the 
acquisition of rights, a form of recognition which, he contends, produces self-
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respect. In respect of the development of rights-claims he endorses T. H. 
Marshall’s broad description of the widening of civil rights as belonging to the 
eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth, and social rights in the 
twentieth century (Honneth, 1996, p. 116). Finally, solidarity occurs in groups 
when each individual understands that she or he is ‘esteemed’  by all citizens 
to the same degree. Solidarity is understood as ‘an interactive relationship in 
which subjects mutually sympathise with their various different ways of life 
because, among themselves, they esteem each other symmetrically,’ while 
societal solidarity is achieved when ‘every member of a society is in a position 
to esteem himself or herself’ (Honneth, 1996, pp. 128-9). He thus describes a 
trajectory in which self-confidence flows from love, self-respect from the 
acquisition of rights, and self-esteem from the development of solidarity. 
When speaking of people esteeming each other ‘symmetrically’ Honneth 
refers to a situation in which we view each other in the light of values that 
allow the abilities and traits of the other to appear significant for shared 
practice, thereby inspiring a genuine concern for the other person rather than 
simply exercising a passive tolerance. The essential point here is every 
subject is free from being collectively denigrated, and competition for social 
esteem acquires a form free from pain, or ‘not marred by experiences of 
disrespect’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 130). The significance of this is that unlike 
some messianic or utopian constructions of human solidarity there are still 
significant differences between people, as well as competing claims. 
 Perhaps the most significant aspects of Honneth’s account is his stress 
on the moral force inherent in the expectation of recognition, at least in 
relation to the struggle for recognition on the levels of rights and societal 
solidarity. For here it is moral feelings of indignation against various forms of 
disrespect that acts as an important motive force for members of movements 
in struggle. Honneth rightly complains that social science has tended to 
reduce motives for rebellion, protest and resistance to categories of ‘interest’,  
with the interests emerging out of objective inequalities in the distribution of 
opportunities (Honneth, 1996, p. 161). He is not suggesting that this basically 
utilitarian model is wrong, but that the ‘fixation on the dimension of interests’ 
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has obscured the significance of moral feelings (Honneth, 1996, p. 166). This 
raises the key question of what sort of moral claims may be justified. Honneth 
accepts that the significance of particular struggles has to be measured in 
terms of the positive or negative contribution that each makes to the 
realisation of ‘undistorted forms of recognition’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 170), 
which points to a strong link with Habermas’s discourse ethics. In a short final 
chapter Honneth takes some tentative steps towards fleshing out the goal of 
a solidaristic society, while taking care to avoid a particular vision of the good 
life. The chapter opens by accepting that if the struggle for recognition is to 
be  viewed as a critical framework for interpreting the processes by which 
societies develop, in order to complete the model there needs to be a 
‘theoretical justification for the normative point of view from which these 
processes can be guided’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 171). However, what follows 
does not meet this promise.  
He reiterates the point that unless one presupposes a certain degree of 
self-confidence and legally guaranteed autonomy, it is impossible to imagine 
successful self-realisation, and the freedom to acquire this self-realisation can 
be acquired only in interaction with others (Honneth, 1996, p. 174). However, 
despite the emphasis on inter-subjectivity, the conditions for recognition 
outlined here clearly give priority to the individual over the community, as 
Andreas Kalyvas has pointed out (Kalyvas, 1999, p. 104). Indeed, there is 
remarkably little said about the social end-state, and the analysis remains 
abstract and formal. On the one hand this abstract and formal nature of the 
patterns of recognition is justified precisely because it avoids falling into the 
utopian trap of specifying particular forms. On the other it is claimed that the 
explication of the conditions for recognition offers more detail about the 
structures of a successful life  than a more general appeal to individual self-
determination (Honneth, 1996, p. 174). Honneth comments that Hegel and 
Mead had failed to achieve their goal of defining a horizon of ethical values 
that would admit to a plurality of life-goals without losing the  collective 
identity through which solidarity is generated (Honneth, 1996, p. 179). This is 
true, but does the recognition of  moral claims inherent in some (unspecified) 
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struggles bring us any closer to resolving that problem? Honneth claims that 
only a transformation of culture can meet those demands in expanded 
relations of solidarity, but he is reluctant to specify what forms this might 
take. As possible candidates he mentions political republicanism, ecologically-
based asceticism, and collective existentialism, but he is unwilling to say 
whether human solidarity is compatible with capitalism, for questions of that 
sort are ‘no longer a matter for theory but rather for the future of social 
struggles’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 176). This strict separation of theory from 
practice evades the tricky question of the extent to which the demands of 
certain social movements are consonant with the broader goal of human 
solidarity. As Kalyvas has argued, Honneth’s concept of recognition does not 
provide the means to distinguish between progressive and reactionary 
movements or identities (Kalyvas, 1999, p. 103). In response Honneth denies 
that he had intended to provide such an evaluative criteria for the judgement 
of recognition demands, and also denies trying to provide a ‘social-theoretical 
sketch which is able to grasp the social reality of recognition relations’. What 
Honneth claims the book is really about is no more and no less than 
highlighting ‘the type of morality which in the social lifeworld  already 
operates in the form of expectations of recognition’ (Honneth, 1999, p. 252). 
The severe limitations of the inter-subjective approach here become 
apparent, for despite the fact that Honneth acknowledges the need to appeal 
hypothetically to a provisional end-state and agrees that social solidarity can 
grow only out of collectively shared goals (Honneth, 1996, p. 171 and p. 
178), he is unable to say anything about these substantive issues. 
 
 
Radical Humanism 
 
Both Rorty and Honneth reject out of hand, and without much discussion, the 
option of  adopting a normative view of what is to be human which could 
serve as the basis for an appeal for human solidarity and a guide to the 
practices and rhetoric which might promote its development. They are, of 
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course, not alone in recoiling from conceptions of the human essence and its 
telos which largely went out of fashion with the advent of the Enlightenment. 
Nevertheless,  since the publication of Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue in 
1981 there has been a renewed interest in  the validity of Aristotelian 
approaches to human essence and human telos within philosophy, if not 
within political philosophy. MacIntyre argued that the Enlightenment attempt 
to justify morality was bound to fail because it had jettisoned the central 
element on which all moral thought up to that time had been based, namely, 
the idea of an essential human nature and a human telos (MacIntyre, 1995, 
pp. 54-5). The abandonment of this idea leaves conventional moral 
philosophy the impossible task of deriving moral precepts from a view of 
‘untutored' human nature. Of course there are obvious dangers in operating 
from a conception of human nature which is both descriptive and normative.1 
Rosalind Hursthouse, a recent exponent of a naturalistic virtue ethics, 
concedes that there is a worry that naturalism of this sort will produce 
exclusive and excluding prescriptions because it ‘will yield far too determinate 
a specification of what it is to be a good human being’ (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 
211).2 Indeed there appears to be a consensus on this point among modern 
emancipatory theorists, for whom the idea of adopting a ‘thick’ conception of 
human nature is fraught with totalitarian dangers (e.g., Young, 1990, p. 36; 
Benhabib,  1986, pp. 32-3; Laclau, 1996, pp. 10-13). However, this shibboleth                        
needs to be challenged. 
 The ‘radical humanist’ approach which I propose draws primarily on 
the work of the social psychologist Erich Fromm, who is, as Raymond Plant 
has pointed out, one of the few communitarian theorists to employ a 
philosophical anthropology in order to ‘objectively’ ground a conception of 
human solidarity (Plant, 2001, p. 294). His theory is  humanist in the sense 
that it operates from an explicitly humanistic ethic, and radical in the sense 
that it requires a wholesale transformation in social relations. Strongly 
influenced by Marx’s work on human essence and its alienation, he considers 
that Marx had provided  the most significant definition of the species 
characteristic of ‘man' (Fromm, 1968, p. 58; Fromm, 1992, chapter 4). In The 
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Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts Marx, operating from an Aristotelian 
philosophical framework, contrasts the grim reality of the workers’ existence 
with the rich promise of their potential as human beings. The worker is de-
humanised, largely reduced to feeling freely active only in his animal functions 
such as eating, drinking and procreating. Marx considers the difference between 
humans and animals and fixes on ‘conscious life activity' as the essentially 
human capability. Whereas animals are ‘one' with their life activity, humans 
make their life activity the object of their will and consciousness. This emphasis 
on ‘activity' is followed by a sharper focus on production, the ability which 
people have to create products for each other in a consciously planned way 
(Marx, 1975: 276). Truly human production, then, transcends the instinctive 
response to immediate physical needs, and we are able to create things in 
accordance with the standards of other species and imbue our products with 
aesthetic qualities. Marx’s insistence that we are essentially social beings (Marx, 
1986, pp. 17-18), combined with our unique ability to produce according to 
reason, amounts to a view of human essence as social creativity (Wilde, 1998, 
chapters 2, 3). Human freedom can be achieved only when all human beings 
express their social creativity by taking full control over their social lives. 
Communism is seen by the young Marx as the ‘real appropriation of the human 
essence by and for man’ and as fully developed naturalism and  humanism 
(Marx, 1975, p. 296). 
  Despite the objections of some commentators that Marx’s distinction 
between human and animal capacities is exaggerated (e.g. Benton, 1993, 
chapter 2; Elster, 1985, pp. 62-8), the empirical evidence is firmly on Marx’s 
side. Furthermore, focusing on production is more tangible than other obvious 
candidates such as abstract rationality or speech. This is not to deny the 
biological closeness between humans and our closest species-relatives, for there 
is a 98 per cent similarity in the chromosomal structures of humans and 
chimpanzees, with no discernible difference in 13 of our chromosomes, as the 
popular scientific writer Matt Ridley points out. However, when comparing 
humans to other species Ridley focuses precisely on the co-operative division of 
labour as the factor which demonstrates the uniqueness of our species and the 
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key to our ecological success (Ridley, 2000, chapter 2). What humans have 
achieved in developing our productive potential, using our much larger brains, is 
qualitatively different than the achievements of our closest species. Marx’s 
distinction is robust, but it is also important to recognise that despite Benton’s 
accusations that Marx is guilty of speciesism (Benton, 1993, pp. 41-2), there is 
no implication that other animals are somehow defective or inferior in Marx’s 
work.3 Although this may appear to be a somewhat arcane exegetal point, it is 
important for the radical humanist project. A humanist project must by 
definition be anthropocentric, but that tells us nothing about human attitudes 
towards non-human nature. Radical humanism strives for the progressive 
realisation of human potential and the transformation of relations between 
human nature and non-human nature in which respect for the latter is a sign of 
the maturity of the former (Wilde, 1998, chapter 7).  
 However, even if we accept the view that what makes us distinctively 
human is our social creativity, does it follow that we ought therefore to take 
control over our own productive lives, collectively and individually? Marx did 
not pursue this question, eschewing moral discourse for fear that it would 
detract from the scientific study of social development. Not until the 
publication of his early writings in the late 1920s and early 1930s did his 
humanism stir the interest of theorists like Bloch, Lefebvre, Marcuse, and 
Fromm. As a social psychologist Fromm initially strove to fuse historical 
materialism with Freudian psychoanalytical categories in order to analyse the 
social character of various social classes as they responded  to socio-
economic change. However, he eventually rejected Freud’s instinctual 
framework and, on the basis of a revised classification of character types, 
went on to develop a humanistic ethics. The ethics in Man For Himself (1947) 
are very much in the spirit of Aristotle and Spinoza, stressing the proper 
purpose of human life as the fulfilment of our essential human potential, with 
the emphasis on the virtuous character and the nature of the good society. 
The task of ethics is to work out how the human essence can achieve its telos 
or purpose through the exercise of the virtues. Fromm is concerned with the 
kind of society in which well-being and integrity can be realised by all people, 
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through the exercise of the potentials which are innate to us as human 
beings. Fromm explicitly criticises all versions of what he terms authoritarian 
ethics, whether in the theological form in the idea of the unworthy sinner in  
Augustine, Luther and Calvin, or even in the apparently more enlightened 
moral system of Kant, which, in his view, harbours a deep suspicion of human 
nature (Fromm, 1990, pp. 12-3 and pp. 211-2). For Fromm, loving one's self 
and loving one's neighbour are natural, inherent attributes of being human, 
and love is the power by which we relate to the world and appropriate it, 
finding fulfilment and happiness only in ‘relatedness and solidarity' with our 
fellows (Fromm, 1990, p. 14). This version of humanistic ethics is based on 
the principle that what is  ‘good' for us is the affirmation of life through the 
unfolding of our powers, provided that this empowerment is not at the 
expense of others, for this would  be tantamount to ‘evil' , which he equates 
with the crippling of our power (Fromm, 1990, p. 20). 
  What is it that makes us essentially human? Like Aristotle and Marx, 
Fromm asks what distinguishes us from other animals. In his view, humans 
have a relatively weak instinctual equipment for survival compared with most 
other animals, but this is compensated by the development of specifically 
human qualities, and  ‘self-awareness, reason and imagination' disrupt the 
harmony which characterises animal nature. The human being is at once part of 
nature and yet transcends the rest of nature; reason drives us to endless 
striving for new solutions to the problems which ever-developing needs confront 
(Fromm, 1990, chapter 3). The human life is essentially one of ‘unavoidable 
disequilibrium', an existential dilemma in which we constantly confront new 
contradictions and strive to resolve them. The response can be progressive or 
regressive, and this is reflected in Fromm’s typology of social character, which 
refers to the traits which comprise the essential nucleus of the character 
structure of  a group. The social character develops as the result of the basic 
life experiences and mode of life common to that group (Fromm, 1997a, p. 
239), and reflects the dynamic adaptation of needs to socio-economic reality. 
It conditions the thinking, feeling, and acting of  individuals, but the process 
is by no means wholly deterministic, and resistance and alternatives to the 
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various non-productive character orientations are always possible. The non-
productive orientations are identified as the receptive, hoarding, exploitative, 
and marketing types. The first three mirror Freudian categories but the 
marketing type is Fromm’s own, denoting the readiness of widespread social 
groups in affluent societies to adjust to the requirements of the market in all 
aspects of life, thereby sacrificing their authentic selves (Fromm, 1990, pp. 62-
82). The productive orientation constitutes the progressive response to the 
challenge of life, and the  productive character serves as an ideal type. In 
recognising that the only meaning to life is that which is given by humans 
through productive living, we open up the possibility of achieving happiness 
through the full realisation of the faculties which are peculiarly human - reason, 
love, and productive work. Furthermore, only through the development of a 
feeling of solidarity with fellow human beings can we attain happiness (Fromm, 
1990, p. 43).  This is the normative basis of his humanism.   
   Fromm’s conception of the unavoidable disequilibrium of human nature 
sets him apart from Marx, who, in Fromm’s view, never overcame the problem 
of holding to the idea that humanity has a general nature while at the same 
time insisting that human nature developed in accordance with historical 
structures (Fromm, 1964, p. 116n). Fromm insists that it makes sense to talk 
about essential human qualities only within the framework of a more general 
view of human essence, that singular form of life which is aware of itself: 
Man is confronted with the frightening conflict of being the 
prisoner of nature, yet being free in his thoughts; being a part of 
nature, and yet to be as it were a freak of nature: being neither 
here nor there. Human self-awareness has made man a stranger 
in the world, separate, lonely, and frightened (Fromm, 1964, p. 
117) 
The working through of the contradiction leads either to the final goal of human 
solidarity or, if the regressive path is taken, ‘complete dehumanisation which is 
the equivalent of madness’ (Fromm, 1964, p. 121). The progressive solution 
involves the development of authentically human qualities towards the goal of 
human solidarity, a condition in which all human beings feel sympathy for each 
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other and are determined to resolve problems peacefully through cooperation. 
Of those authentic human qualities, his identification of rationality and 
productiveness echoes the views of Aristotle and Marx, while ‘love’ reflects the 
importance accorded to the nurturing process in character development and the 
significance of close relationships in securing esteem. ‘Love’ is therefore at the 
heart of our sociality, although Fromm is under no illusions about the difficulty 
of expressing it in inauspicious times, as he makes clear in The Art of Loving  
(Fromm, 1995, pp. 65–83).4 
 In his final book,  To Have or To Be?, Fromm argues that the capitalist 
ideology of unlimited production, absolute freedom and unrestricted 
happiness amount to a new religion of Progress, ‘The Great Promise', based 
on the psychological premises that radical hedonism and egotism will lead to 
harmony and peace. The promise, of course, can never be met, for it is 
premised on not delivering general satisfaction but encouraging 
acquisitiveness, and the individual can never be satisfied because, as Fromm 
says, ‘there is no end to my wishes' (Fromm, 2002, p. 6). Indeed the logic of 
accumulation also encourages a constant fear of losing what we have gained. 
He argues that the pursuit of money, prestige and power prevents us from 
recognising the interests of our real self, and he bemoans the fact that we 
bow down to the ‘anonymous power of the market' and ‘of the machine 
whose servants we have become' (Fromm, 1990, p. 248). However, unlike his 
erstwhile colleagues in the Frankfurt School, Fromm’s jeremiads are 
counterbalanced by a sense of hope, and he argues that despite these 
structural pressures the human race has retained and developed ‘such 
qualities of dignity, courage, decency and kindness as we find them 
throughout history and in countless individuals today’ (Fromm, 1997a, p. 
232). 
Fromm keeps open the possibility that, on the basis of what we share as 
human beings, we are capable of creating a society in which relationships of 
domination and submission are replaced by a condition of solidarity (Fromm, 
1997a, p. 228). This involves  replacing processes which reduce most 
individuals to insignificance by active and intelligent cooperation through the 
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extension of the democratic principle into the economic sphere (Fromm, 
1997a, p. 235).  
 What does the emancipated individual in the free society look like? The 
emphasis is on a productive disposition and social relations infused with 
solidarity and love. Productiveness is the full realisation of creative human 
powers without the imposition of power over our fellow human beings, as well 
as the development of loving relationships based on care, responsibility, 
respect, and knowledge, culminating in solidarity on the basis of an ideal 
(Fromm, 2002, chapter 5). In listing the qualities of the character structure of 
the ‘new’, emancipated person, the emphasis is on the need to take full 
responsibility for our lives,  to develop love and respect for life, to reduce 
greed and hate, and to exercise our imagination in the struggle to remove 
intolerable circumstances (Fromm, 2002 pp. 170-2). Fromm speaks of the 
ideal of inner activity whereby individuals give expression to their faculties 
and talents and to the wealth of human gifts with which we are all, in varying 
degrees, endowed (Fromm, 2002, p. 88). Ideally, the productive character 
would live life in the ‘being mode’, a situation in which our activities are 
productive in the sense of being consciously directed towards the enrichment 
of human existence, as opposed to the having mode in which activity is 
directed to acquiring wealth and power over others (Fromm, 2002, pp. 22-6). 
If an individual is unable to exercise productiveness Fromm concludes that 
this will result in ‘dysfunction and unhappiness’  and if productiveness is 
denied across society the result is a ‘socially patterned defect’ (Fromm, 1990, 
pp. 219-21).  
 It may be objected that Fromm’s view of what constitutes the fully 
lived or truly human life is arbitrary and unreasonably optimistic, but he 
insists that his normative principles are ‘objectively valid' and strongly rejects 
the argument  that objectively valid statements can be made only about facts 
and not about values (Fromm, 1990, pp. 16-17). He points to the arts and 
also to applied sciences such as medicine and engineering, where it is 
common to construct objectively valid norms by which to judge the success of 
a project, and where failure to comply with them is penalised by poor results. 
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In his own sphere, he insists that living is an art and that humanistic ethics is 
‘the applied science of the "art of living" based upon the theoretical "science 
of man" (Fromm, 1990, p. 18). Fromm accepts that despite a wealth of data 
from anthropology and psychology we have only a very tentative picture of 
human nature, but he insists that ‘objectively valid' does not mean ‘absolute’, 
and that all scientific progress is based on provisional truths (Fromm, 1990, p. 
16). He repeatedly stresses the empirical and scientific nature of his 
psychology. This is based largely on decades of practice as a psychoanalyst, 
and he claims that ‘there is not a single theoretical conclusion about man's 
psyche...which is not based on a critical observation of human behaviour 
carried out in the course of this psychoanalytical work’ (Fromm, 1962, p. 10). 
However, how does Fromm’s theoretical ‘science of man’ stand up in the light 
of the immense advance in the empirical science of humanity which we have 
seen in recent years? The first draft of the complete human genome was 
published in February 2001, opening the way for a far deeper understanding 
of the species. However, while bioinformatics may reveal the genetic origins 
of various temperaments, there is no indication that it will tell us more about 
character, and Fromm makes a clear distinction between the two when 
stating that ‘temperament refers to the mode of reaction and is constitutional 
and not changeable; character is essentially formed by a person’s 
experiences… and changeable, to some extent, by insights and new kinds of 
experience’ (Fromm, 1990, p. 52). In respect of social character, the relevant 
science  is that of social or political psychology. 
 Although radical humanism places a normative stress on the realisation 
of natural positive potentials, Fromm is well aware that humans also have a 
powerful negative potential for destructiveness. However, he considers 
destructiveness to be a ‘secondary potentiality', something which, although it 
possesses all the power and intensity of any passion,  is essentially an 
alternative to creativeness that arises when the will to create cannot be 
satisfied (Fromm, 1990, p. 218 cf. Fromm, 1991, pp. 37-8). His most 
sustained work, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, refutes the 
arguments of instinctivists and behaviourists who view aggression per se to 
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be natural and inevitable, arguing instead that ‘malignant aggression'  is 
essentially a manifestation of the breakdown of creativeness (Fromm, 1997b, 
p. 24).  Potentially serious destructive tendencies such as greed and envy are 
certainly strong, not, however, because of their inherent intensity but because 
of  the difficulty of resisting the ‘public pressure to be a wolf with the wolves’ 
(Fromm, 1996, p. 194). In other words it is the social consequences of the 
accumulation system, with its ultra-competitiveness and indifference to 
human suffering, which produces destructive behaviour. A radical challenge to 
the antagonistic structures of social existence would be required in order to 
nullify malignant aggression. For Fromm, the anthropological evidence points  
to a preponderance of cooperation and sharing among prehistoric humans, 
with large-scale destructiveness following on from the development of 
organised state power (Fromm, 1997b, p. 575). But the point is that such 
destructiveness is not the norm but the exception to it, for society could not 
have survived and developed if the destructive urges were dominant and 
irresistible aspects of our human nature. The permanent war of each against 
all would have led to extinction a long time ago. Nevertheless, the threat of 
extinction is still present and therefore the need for a fundamental change of 
heart is vital. There is no false optimism here, but rather a plea that ‘a new 
ethic, a new attitude towards nature, human solidarity and cooperation are 
necessary if the Western world is not to be wiped out’ (Fromm, 2002, p. 
198).5 
 How can such an ethic develop from and in the reality of an alienated 
world? For Fromm alienation is neither total nor irredeemable. Ultimately he is 
convinced that the goal of human solidarity can be achieved only through 
some form of  humanistic socialism, but he is very critical of all forms of 
socialism which proved to be as authoritarian and anti-human as the capitalist 
social system they set out to oppose. He pleads for democratic socialism to 
return to the human aspects of the social problem, criticising capitalism from 
the standpoint of ‘what it does to the human qualities of man, to his soul and 
his spirit’, and addressing the specific forms through which we can build a 
society which points to the end of alienation and ‘the idolatry of economy and 
  
P
t-Print
 19
of the state’ (Fromm, 1991, p. 269 and pp. 362-3). The emphasis is on 
subordinating the economic and political spheres of society to human 
development. In modern society, a healthy economy is possible only at the 
price of unhealthy human beings, and the task is to construct a healthy 
economy for healthy people (Fromm, 2002, p. 176). Fromm was a political 
activist who campaigned for a number of causes which he considered might 
contribute to the change of direction that he considered so imperative. He 
was not, however, a political theorist, and there is no systematic relationship 
between his humanistic ethics and the various proposals and movements 
which he supported. However, radical humanism could serve as a basis for 
the development of such a theory of human solidarity. One interesting feature 
of Fromm’s interventions is the different ‘levels’ of social activity which they 
cover, from campaigns for nuclear disarmament and justice for the less 
developed world at the global level, through appeals for democratic renewal 
at the state level, and arguments for radical consumer power, women’s 
emancipation, humanistic work relations, and basic guaranteed income at the 
level of everyday life.6 
 The radical humanist perspective then, accords broadly with the sort of 
Red-Green politics which has developed since Fromm’s death in 1980, but it 
identifies progressive possibilities in a wide range of struggle, including, for 
example, the work of trades unions in asserting the dignity of labour. The 
emerging global anti-capitalist movement, embracing activists from social 
movements old and new, expresses its concerns about global injustice in an 
ethical language which contains an implicit appeal to self realisation as 
something that is due naturally to all human beings. Theoretically, the radical 
humanist perspective on human solidarity complements the substantive 
concerns of those theorists who stress the need to develop some form of 
global community or cosmopolitan citizenship (e.g. Linklater, 1998; Touraine, 
2000; Harvey, 2000; Held, 1995). However, this brings us back to the crucial 
question of potential conflict between the ideal of human solidarity on a 
global scale and solidarity generated within particular communities, perhaps 
as a defensive response to the depredations of globalisation. 
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Human Solidarity versus National Community 
 
We noted earlier that the expression of particular solidarities normally takes 
place in opposition to other groups. Yet can the universal goal of human 
solidarity somehow be inscribed in the day to day struggles of particular 
groups? This, of course, was part of the original socialist project, but socialist 
internationalism proved somewhat chimerical. Fromm’s radical humanism is 
extremely hostile to political nationalism. It is uncompromising on this issue 
and is therefore incompatible with those communitarian  theorists who argue 
for inclusive political community from a liberal nationalist perspective (e.g. 
Miler, 1990; Mason, 2000). This has important implications when considering 
the ubiquity of patriotism, routinely adopted in political rhetoric and 
embedded in cultural practices. Fromm, who grew up in Germany during the 
First World War, was appalled at the ‘crazy pattern of hate and national self-
glorification’ (Fromm, 1962, p. 7). His abhorrence of tribalism and nationalism 
is an expression of a deep ‘universalism’ which is a prerequisite for a 
commitment to human solidarity. ‘Nationalism’, he writes, ‘is our form of 
incest, is our idolatry, is our insanity’, and ‘patriotism is its cult’ (Fromm, 
1991, pp. 58-9). To be sure he recognises the validity of an emotional 
attachment to the culture and tradition of one’s community, for if we did not 
have that feeling for the particular forms in which we celebrate our living 
together it would be difficult to develop the active interest in other cultures 
which is necessary if human solidarity is to be developed. In a lecture 
delivered in 1962 entitled “A New Humanism as a Condition for the One 
World”, Fromm predicted the imminent emergence of global society and 
posed the stark choice which would face humanity as the One World became 
a reality. On the one hand, we could regress to nationalisms and tribalisms 
that would destroy the world, on the other we could work for a new 
humanism through which we could ‘get in touch with that which we share 
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with all humanity’ (Fromm, 1998, p. 78). In this section I want to flag up 
radical humanism’s firm rejection of liberal nationalism. 
 David Miller has argued that the collective identities ‘possessed’ by 
people are predominantly national identities, and that therefore the sphere of 
the nation is where ‘the promise of overall community must be redeemed’ 
(Miller, 1990, p. 238). Although he opposes nationalism as a cult of 
nationhood and a badge of aggression towards outsiders, he sees nationality 
as a predominant form of collective identity which can be used as a basis for 
developing self-determination and distributive justice, and he sees the nation 
as ‘the only possible form in which overall community can be realised in 
modern societies’ (Miller, 1990, p. 245). The problem here is that these 
national identities are historically constructed for the benefit of the socio-
economic elites of each nation-state, and that they normally rest on myths 
which have no rational basis. Given the virtually uncontested inculcation of 
these myths in the areas of education, information and entertainment, and in 
their symbolic ubiquity through flags, anthems and honours, what is 
surprising is that so many people in fact identify themselves in other ways 
than by nationality, despite Miller’s assertion to the contrary. Many people see 
their collective identities in terms of their local community, religion, ethnic 
background, gender,  political ideology, occupation, in a variety of 
combinations. It must, of course, be acknowledged that decisive political 
progress towards greater solidarity within societies and on a global scale must 
take place within established political entities, but are those entities so closely 
tied to nationality as they were in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? We 
see states with multiple nationalities, and, most significantly, a European 
Union embracing many states and regions. Nor can nationality be detached 
from nationalism or patriotism as easily as Miller would like. The political 
groups of the extreme right display an aggressive nationalism which is not an 
aberration from a more tolerant and benign patriotic political culture. Rather it 
feeds on a deeply embedded ideology of patriotism which has been 
propagandised in all the major liberal-constitutional states for the past two 
hundred years. 
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 Nevertheless, it is impossible to sustain a coherent humanist 
perspective on human solidarity which completely disregards the fact of 
nationality. It is quite clear that groups of people have been and continue to 
be systematically oppressed and express a legitimate demand for self-
determination, however difficult this may be to ascertain. This desire for 
statehood necessarily involves nationalistic expressions of solidarity, but it still 
runs the risk of oppressing other minorities either in the course of the 
struggle or in the newly formed state. It is preferable and perfectly possible to 
make a non-nationalist case to support a goal which is normally formulated in 
nationalist terms, as Terry Eagleton (1999) has done in the case of Ireland. In 
those states which are not subject to national oppression, it is difficult to 
imagine that even a moderate form of nationalism could advance the cause of 
human solidarity.  Stephen Nathanson has argued for just such a moderate 
nationalism, whereby a commitment to a particular nation is combined with a 
recognition of duties to treat all people decently. He argues that with this 
universalist component nationalism is ‘a morally legitimate pursuit of group 
goals and group well-being’ (Nathanson, 1997, p. 185), but this is still much 
further than what he terms ‘global humanism’ will find acceptable. It is in line 
with Rorty’s commitment to patriotism, for he argues that without an 
emotional attachment to one’s country it would be impossible to feel shame 
when unjust social practices are exposed (Rorty, 1999, pp. 252-4). The 
problem here is that the cult of patriotism is far more likely to serve to mask 
the faults in a society rather than to expose them, and far more likely to 
encourage bellicosity and hatred of the outsider. Ideally a democratic polity 
would strive for the well-being of its citizens without recourse to nationalist 
rhetoric. People within such a polity could relate to each other in solidaristic 
ways without the illusion of national homogeneity and the divisiveness which 
must always be associated with it.  
 As Craig Calhoun has argued, the force of nationalist rhetoric is so 
strong and pervasive that most academic discussions of ‘society’ operate from 
an unstated assumption that societies are bounded and discrete and that the 
nation-state is the natural model (Calhoun 1999, pp. 217-31). In the case of 
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Honneth, for example, there is no discussion of whether ‘societal solidarity’ 
applies to state society or global society or the problems of moving from one 
to the other. Calhoun also notes that even when the need to accommodate 
diversity is recognised, as with multi-culturalism, the cultures too are normally 
taken to be homogeneous, rather than in constant development: 
The idea that people need ‘naturally’ to feel at home in a taken-
for-granted and internally homogenous community contends 
with the creation of polities and cultural fields too large and 
differentiated to be organised as communities. Within such 
larger settings, it is not an adequate response to human 
differences to allow each person to find the group within which 
they feel at home (Calhoun, 1999, p. 228). 
Calhoun concludes that it is crucial to create a public space in which people 
are free to engage with each other in making decisions, developing culture 
and re-creating identities. Vague though this may seem, it presents a serious 
challenge for politicians, academics, writers, and indeed all those with the 
opportunity to contribute to the discourse about the development of a greater 
level of understanding within and between cultures. It points to the need for 
the further development of new forms of political engagement which reach 
beyond the formal institutions of the nation state and seek to link the 
particular with the universal. The World Social Forum at Porto Allegre in 2001 
offers an  example.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A radical humanist perspective offers a philosophical grounding for an appeal 
for human solidarity, a theoretical strategy shunned by alternative 
approaches. It provides a basis for sympathy and compassion for victims of 
oppression and exploitation, and a warning of the unsustainability of 
persisting with a global neo-liberalism which is blind to its social 
consequences. The normative goals of the fulfilment of productiveness, 
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rationality, love and solidarity among all people offer broad evaluative criteria  
which could be employed to identify the policies, practices and movements 
which carry forward the struggle for human solidarity at the levels of 
everyday life, state-centred politics and global politics; this is a project which 
has still to be developed. In its substantive concerns the radical humanist 
approach to human solidarity works for the subordination of economic and 
technological  rationality to the essential human needs of people everywhere 
and supports a radical political ‘catch up’ to remedy the democratic deficit 
created by economic globalisation. 
 Finally, let us return to the widely-stated suspicion that a normative 
view of human essence and its fulfilment necessarily invites authoritarian or 
exclusionary views of the good life. In the radical humanist perspective on 
human solidarity outlined above the ethical goal of the universal development 
of the productive character living in the being mode is not only compatible 
with cultural diversity but requires it. Fromm envisions the creation of social 
conditions which develop the peculiarities of persons, sexes, and national 
groups, making for a ‘richer and broader’ human culture (Fromm, 1997c, p. 
115). In the multiculturalism which has developed with globalisation there are 
signs that this may be developing, and, as Honneth points out, there is 
already a strong moral component implicit in the claims to recognition of a 
wide variety of social groups. And yet, in the absence of a radical humanist 
transformation of social conditions we are also witnessing the entrenchment 
of numerous fundamentalisms which constitute the greatest obstacle to the 
ideal of human solidarity. The expression of cultural diversity is not always 
rich and progressive. There are no easy remedies to this, but the radical 
humanist approach to human solidarity makes a strong case that these 
crippling ideological divisions require an explicitly ethical response. 
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1 The standard objection that such a formulation commits the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ of deriving 
values from facts, or the ‘ought’ from the ‘is’, is overcome by acknowledging that some facts are 
permeated by values (e.g. MacIntyre, 1985, pp. 56-9; Kain, 1991, pp. 30-2), and that ‘ought’ is 
built in to what it is to be human.  
 
2 Hursthouse nevertheless presents a convincing account of how a viable naturalistic virtue 
ethics can operate. Her book is breath of fresh air in a fatalistic intellectually climate, and it is 
refreshing to read her concluding sentence, in which she conjoins us to ‘Keep hope alive’ 
(Hurstshouse, 1999, p. 265).   
 
3 I argue this at length in Wilde (2000b). In the passages referred to Benton imputes that 
Marx denigrates animal production by speaking of ‘merely’ animal production or need on no 
less than nine occasions, but Marx never uses this word or any other expressions which imply 
the inferiority of animals. Difference does not necessarily imply superiority or inferiority.   
 
4 This raises a question about how, ideally, we might envisage social relationships in a 
condition of human solidarity, since we cannot love strangers or consider them our friends. 
Although space does not permit a full answer to this question I find it difficult to use 
‘friendship’ as a model for solidarity, as Diane Rothleder (1999) has attempted to do explicitly 
and Jacques Derrida (1997) more circumspectly. The closeness of the bond of friendship 
militates against its extension to a wider compass. However, the development of our self-
consciousness as loving beings can lead to a wider predisposition to welcome and learn from 
the stranger. Iseult Honohan’s (2001) suggestion that ‘colleague’ or ‘work-mate’ can be used 
to evoke a commonality neither as close as friend nor as distant as stranger is a step in the 
right   direction, although I favour the image of ‘actor’, with all its entailed ambivalence. 
 
5 A similar conclusion, based on an analysis of species potential, is expressed by David 
Harvey in Spaces of Hope (Harvey, 2000, pp. 206-12). 
 
 
6 For a review of Erich Fromm’s political positions see Wilde (2000a). Fromm’s social and 
political interventions are found mainly in Fromm (1968), Fromm (1991) and Fromm (2002, 
chapter 9).  
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